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supported on the basis of public policy. The number of people who
find themselves in the employee's corner of the triangular relation-
ship is large and growing.8" The majority view jeopardizes the
security of this large segment of the American working population
who have entered into the insurance arrangement in good faith. The
insurance companies, on the other hand, are not only in a position
to exercise a closer control over the employer to keep mismanage-
ment at a minimum, but they are also in a position to spread thecost of such mismanagement to the public at large. As a matter of
public policy, the insurer should be made to treat such losses as a
part of the cost of doing business and to include such costs in arriv-
ing at the dollar amount of premiums to be charged.4"
David S. Murray
THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY:
JACKSON v. JACKSON (CAL. 1967);
HESS v. WHITSITT (CAL. App. 1967)
For nearly a century California statutes have provided com-
panion presumptions favoring the legitimacy of children born during
wedlock or within a competent time thereafter.' The presumption is
disputable in cases where the husband and wife were not cohabiting
at the time of conception.' However, Evidence Code section 621
39 R. EILERS AND R. CROWE, GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 50-52 (1965). See also,
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 26-28 (1961).
40 Although the supreme court reversed the trial court's finding that Fullerton
was not New York Life's agent, it sent the case back to the trial court so that it
might be determined whether Mr. Elfstrom, as beneficiary, partook in the misrepre-
sentation of his daughter's eligibilty made to the insurer. Elfstrom v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 67 A.C. 511, 520, 432 P.2d 731, 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35, 44 (1967). If it is
found that he did, New York Life may avoid the policy. See e.g. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Zivitz, 243 Ala. 379, 10 So. 2d 276 (1942).
1 CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 621, 661 (West 1966) formerly CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc.§§ 1962 (5), 1963(31) (West 1955); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 193-95 (West 1955) (originally
enacted in 1872). In enacting Evidence Code section 621, "conclusively" was substi-
tuted for "indisputably." This was not intended to effect any substantive change.
Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 243 n.1, 430 P.2d 289, 290 n.1, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649,
650 n.1 (1967); Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, 7 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDIES 105 (1965). [The conclusive presumption arising out of cohabitation will be
referred to herein as "the indisputable presumption."].
2 "A child of a woman who is or has been married, born during the marriage
or within 300 days after the dissolution thereof, is presumed to be a legitimate child
of that marriage. This presumption may be disputed . . . ." CAL. EviD. CODE § 661
(West 1966).
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provides that "notwithstanding any other provision of law, the is-
sue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is
conclusively presumed to be legitimate."8 The latter presumption,
being conclusive, is actually a rule of substantive law.4 In two re-
cent cases involving this latter presumption, the courts were called
upon to consider the admissibility of evidence of blood tests5 and
racial characteristics6 that tended to preclude the husband as the
father of a child born to his wife during lawful wedlock.
In Jackson v. Jackson,7 the husband had been ordered to pay
child support and legal and medical expenses in connection with
the birth of a child to the wife approximately nine months after
the date of the marriage. The only cohabitation had been a four-
day honeymoon in the couple's apartment after which the wife
had departed; there had been no contact thereafter. In support
of his motion to terminate the prior court orders, the husband
offered evidence of blood tests indicating that he could not have
fathered the child. On appeal to the supreme court it was held
that the test results were admissible, not for the purpose of over-
coming the indisputable presumption, but rather for the purpose
of showing that the child was not conceived during cohabitation
and that, therefore, the indisputable presumption was not appli-
cable. The dissenting opinion concluded that the effect of the
court's holding was to add an exception to the indisputable pre-
sumption, thereby subverting a longstanding public policy favor-
ing legitimacy.8
In Hess v. Wkitsitt,9 the husband and wife were Caucasian
while the wife's child was of mixed blood, evidencing both Negro
and Caucasian characteristics and bearing a close physical resem-
blance to the defendant, a Negro. It was not disputed that the
child had been conceived at a time when the husband and wife
were cohabiting although the wife had had sexual relations with
both the defendant and her husband during that period. In an ac-
tion against the alleged father to establish paternity and obtain a
child support order the district court of appeal held that the child
was conclusively presumed to be the legitimate issue of the hus-
3 CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966).
.4 Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 619, 354 P.2d 657, 668, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 140
(1960); McBAINE, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 1273 (2d ed. 1960).
5 Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
6 Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 A.C.A. 618, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967), hearing denied, 68
A.C. No. 8 (1968) (minutes at 3).
7 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
8 Id. at 245, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.




band and wife. The only exception to the presumption was that
provided by the statute itself, i.e., impotence. Language in earlier
California cases suggesting a "racial difference" exception was held
to be dicta which had never risen to the level of a rule of law.
This note examines the Jackson and Hess decisions in light
of the historical background and development of Evidence Code
section 621.
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
The Common Law Presumption
At early common law, the child of a married woman was
conclusively presumed to be legitimate unless the husband was
beyond the realm or incapable of procreation.'0 Professor Wigmore
has characterized the evolution of the presumption since that time
as a reduction of the instances in which it is conclusive, brought
about by an expansion of the instances in which it is rebuttable."
The most notable examples of this pattern arose during the first
half of the 19th century when the English courts handed down the
landmark decisions in the Banbury Peerage Case'" and Hargrave
v. Hargrave13 wherein the contemporary common law presumption
of legitimacy was formulated. 4
Banbury involved the legitimacy of a son born to the wife
of the Earl of Banbury, the Earl an octogenarian at the time.' In
response to questions posed by a committee of the House of Lords,
the judges set forth the following rules. A child born in lawful
wedlock, the husband not being proved impotent, is prima facie
legitimate. This presumption can be overcome only by proving
that the husband was impotent or that he did not engage in sex-
ual relations 6 with his wife at a time when, according to the laws
l0 Coke Lit. § 244a.
11 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2527 (3d ed. 1940).
12 57 Eng. Rep. 62 (H.L. 1811).
3 50 Eng. Rep. 546 (Ch. 1846).
14 J. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 340-41 (1931). "Any detailed
consideration of the American cases is unnecessary, for they, like the subsequent
English cases, in the main, look back to the Banbury Peerage Case and Hargrave v.
Hargrave . . .in order to determine the rule of the common law .... " Estate of
Walker, 180 Cal. 478, 490, 181 P. 792, 797 (1919).
15 See Estate of Walker, 180 Cal. 478, 486, 181 P. 792, 795 (1919).
16 The terms "access" and "opportunities for access" appear in the case but are
used to indicate sexual intercourse or the opportunity for sexual intercourse: "That,
after proof given of such access . . . (by which we understand proof of sexual inter-
course between them) no evidence can be received .... ." Banbury Peerage Case, 57
Eng. Rep. 62, 63 (H.L. 1811); "The non-existence of sexual intercourse is generally
expressed by the words 'non-access of the husband to the wife;' and we understand
[Vol. 8
CASE NOTES
of nature, he could be the father. Where there have been oppor-
tunities for intercourse with the wife at the relevant time, such
intercourse is presumed. When, by presumption or otherwise, evi-
dence of intercourse between the husband and wife at the relevant
time is offered, a finding of paternity and legitimacy can be avoided
only by evidence going to disprove the occurrence of such inter-
course.17
In Hargrave v. Hargrave,"8 the Banbury rules were formu-
lated into what is generally referred to as Lord Langdale's rule:
A child born of a married woman is, in the first instance, presumed
to be legitimate. The presumption thus established by law is not to be
rebutted by circumstances which only create doubt and suspicion; but
may be wholly removed by proper and sufficient evidence, showing that
the husband was: 1. Incompetent. 2. Entirely absent, so as to have no
intercourse or communication of any kind with the mother. 3. Entirely
absent, at the period during which the child must, in the course of
nature, have been begotten; or, 4. Only present, under such circum-
stances as afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual
intercourse. Such evidence as this puts an end to the question, and
establishes the illegitimacy of the child of a married woman.19
The court added that where it was shown that there had been
opportunities for sexual intercourse, the husband was entitled to
show the absence of such intercourse but he could not introduce
evidence that any other man might have been the father of the
child. °
Thus, Banbury and Hargrave announced that the presumption
of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock was prima facie rather
than conclusive. In a sense, however, the presumption had never
really been conclusive insofar as it allowed for proof of impotence
or absence of the husband beyond the "four seas." Conversely, the
modern "prima facie" rule operated conclusively in cases where
the husband failed to show nonintercourse or incompetency. For
example, a husband who admitted intercourse with his wife at the
relevant time was conclusively presumed to be the father notwith-
standing the availability of contrary evidence. Logically, these
those expressions as applied to the present question, as meaning the same thing." Id.
at 64.
17 "In the Banbury case . . .inferences from circumstantial evidence were con-
sidered sufficient; and it was said that the presumption of legitimacy might be re-
butted, not only by direct and conclusive evidence which negated the possibility of
sexual intercourse having taken place, but by circumstances which might convince
those who had to decide the question, that it did not take place." H. NIcOLAS, TREATISE
ON ADULTERINE BAsTARDY 265 (1836).
18 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (H.L. 1846).




rules precluded the admission of evidence of divergent racial char-
acteristics or, had such data been available at the time, negative
blood test results.
The California Presumptions
As will be seen, the California statutory provisions, enacted
in 1872, embraced the English rules-with one restriction. Under
the English view, the presumption could be rebutted by proof of
nonintercourse even in a case where the parties were cohabiting at
the time of conception. In California, however, section 1962(5) of
the Code of Civil Procedure raised an indisputable presumption
when cohabitation was established, provided that the husband was
not impotent." Thus, in Estate of Mills,22 the court refused to
receive evidence that, although the couple had been cohabiting,
the husband had always slept in a separate room and the wife had
shared her bed with Mills, a boarder. After defining "cohabitation"
as "the living together of a man and woman ostensibly as husband
and wife,"23 the court held that the presumption was by definition
indisputable and, therefore, no evidence could be received to rebut
it.24
After considering the nature of the indisputable presumption
in Mills, the supreme court next examined the disputable presump-
tion of Civil Code section 194 in Estate of Walker. 5 In Walker,
the husband and wife had lived apart for four years prior to his
death in 1913.20 Five months thereafter, the widow gave birth to
twin sons. The court indicated that California had codified the
21 Now CAL. EVID. CODE § 621.
22 137 Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 (1902).
23 Id. at 301, 70 P. at 92.
24 Beyond the fact that the statute precluded the admission of such evidence,
it was also inadmissible under Lord Mansfield's Rule since it consisted of testimony
by the wife as to non-access. See generally 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2063 (3d ed. 1940).
In California, this restriction applies only in cases involving the conclusive presump-
tion. Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 100, 183 P. 552, 559 (1919); McBAINE,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 209 (2d ed. 1960).
The Mills court also suggested that the indisputable presumption was not incon-
sistent with the four exceptions to the modern common law presumption as enumer-
ated in Hargrave v. Hargrave, 50 Eng. Rep. 546 (Ch. 1846). However, in Hargrave,
Lord Langdale went on to say, "In the course of the investigation, I apprehend that
evidence may be adduced, for the purpose of shewing the absence of sexual inter-
course .... " 50 Eng. Rep. at 548. The holding in Mills does limit this aspect of the
decision in Hargrave. The limitation was noted in Estate of Walker, 180 Cal. 478,
181 P. 792 (1919), "The English rule would seem to go so far as to permit evidence
of nonintercourse even where the parties are cohabiting, i.e., living together in the
same house or apartments. Such is not the rule in this state." Id. at 491, 181 P. at
797 (citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1962(5) and Estate of Mills).
25 180 Cal. 478, 181 P. 792 (1919).
26 176 Cal. 402, 407, 168 P. 689, 690 (1917) (first appeal).
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common law rule as announced in Banbury and Hargrave by en-
acting the disputable presumptions of legitimacy.2 7 Accordingly,
the court held that there being no technical cohabitation, evidence
of nonintercourse was admissible even though it was shown that
there had been opportunities for intercourse and even though the
wife had testified as to acts of intercourse with the husband.
Also in accord with the common law rule was the court's deter-
mination that where actual intercourse was shown to have occurred
between the husband and wife at a time when it was possible by
the laws of nature that he was the father, the presumption became
conclusive and no inquiry would be allowed as to the probability
of someone else being the father.2" Additionally, in dictum, the
court expanded the Banbury-Hargrave rule by announcing an ex-
ception to the presumption in cases where the racial characteristics
of the child precluded the possibility that the husband was the
father.2
Having considered the indisputable presumption in isolation
in Mills, and the disputable presumption in isolation in Walker,
the supreme court next examined a case involving both presump-
tions. In Estate of McNamara, ° the husband and wife had co-
habited for approximately five months when she left him and went
to live with McNamara. Three hundred and four days after her
departure the wife gave birth to a son; there had been no oppor-
tunity for intercourse with the husband in the interim. Since the
indisputable presumption arises only when conception and cohabi-
tation concur, the court was forced to consider the likelihood of a
304-day gestation period. Assuming as a matter of law that inter-
course took place on the last day of cohabitation, the court held
that, although it was possible that the husband was the father, the
indisputable presumption did not apply where the gestation period
necessary to reach that result would be contrary to the usual opera-
tion of the laws of nature, e.g., 304 days. The court distinguished
the broad language in Walker, that once the possibility of paternity
on the part of the husband was established, no inquiry would be
27 180 Cal. 478, 491, 181 P. 792, 797 (1919). See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 621, 661
(West 1966).
28 "There is no doubt but that the presumption of legitimacy goes at least to
this extent: that if it appear that by the laws of nature it is possible that the
husband is the father (that is, if it appears that the husband had intercourse with the
mother during the period of possible conception), legitimacy is conclusively presumed
... " 180 Cal. at 484, 181 P. at 794. But see Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354
P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960) (Blood test results may be conclusive against the
disputable presumption.) ; Adoption of Stroope, 232 Cal. App. 2d 581, 43 Cal. Rptr. 40
(1965) (Sterility is substantial evidence rebutting the disputable presumption.).
29 180 Cal. at 491, 181 P. at 797.
30 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919).
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made into the probabilities as to someone else being the father,
as merely stating the rule "in a general way.""
By way of dictum, the court again acknowledged the existence
of a "racial difference" exception. 2 Noting that the element of in-
determinability normally present when either of two men could be
the father is absent when a racial factor is added, the court reasoned
that the same element of indeterminability is absent when only one
of the men had engaged in intercourse with the mother during the
usual period of conception.13 After finding the indisputable pre-
sumption inapplicable, the court determined that the evidence was
sufficiently "clear and satisfactory" to overcome the residual prima
facie presumption of legitimacy.
Following McNamara, cases involving the indisputable pre-
sumption generally focused on the question of whether conception
was concurrent with cohabitation. In these cases, the presumption
was held inapplicable if birth occurred shortly after cohabitation
began 4 or long after cohabitation terminated.35
31 Id. at 89, 183 P. at 555.
32 Id. at 96, 183 P. at 557, 558. The acknowledgement loses some of its force
upon an examination of the authorities offered in support of it. In two of the cases,
the statements were dicta: Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451 (1852);
Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige 139 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). The cases directly in point were from
jurisdictions where public policy considerations may have been influential: Bullock v.
Knox, 96 Ala. 195, 11 So. 339 (1892) ; Watkins v. Carlton, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 560
(1840).
33 181 Cal. at 96, 183 P. at 557, 558. It is doubtful that indeterminability is, or
ever has been, the test in applying the statutory conclusive presumption arising out
of cohabitation. In Mills, the evidence offered would have made it possible to deter-
mine that the husband was not the father. The evidence was rejected on the ground
that it was offered to dispute a presumption made indisputable by the statute. Cf.
Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 A.C.A. 618, 622, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1967), hearing denied,
68 A.C. No. 8 (1968) (minutes at 3).
The McNamara court, in considering the effect of determinability, spoke in terms
of a conclusive presumption raised by actual intercourse rather than the statutory
conclusive presumption raised by cohabitation: "The reason for going beyond the
prima facie presumption and applying a conclusive presumption wherever the hus-
band has had intercourse with the wife during the time when the child must
normally have been conceived, although others as well may have had intercourse
with her during the same period, is the impossibility of determining under such
circumstances who is the father. . . . [In the racial] instances .. . the element of
indeterminability which is the reason for the presumption in the ordinary case is
absent. . . .The same element of indeterminability is lacking in the [extended gesta-
tion] cases under consideration . . . ... Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 95-96, 183
P. 552, 557-58 (1919).
34 Anderson v. Anderson, 214 Cal. 414, 5 P.2d 881 (1931) (105 days after
marriage; however, premarital intercourse was alleged and thus a 200 day period
was at issue.) ; Smith v. Heilman, 171 Cal. App. 2d 424, 340 P.2d 752 (1952) (198
days); Murr v. Murr, 87 Cal. App. 2d 511, 197 P.2d 369 (1948) (190 days). Com-
pare Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App. 2d 15, 122 P.2d 308 (1942) (250 days considered
usual and normal; therefore indisputable presumption applied.).
35 Whitney v. Whitney, 169 Cal. App. 2d 209, 337 P.2d 219 (1959) (297 days);
McKee v. McKee, 156 Cal. App. 2d 764, 320 P.2d 510 (1958) (304 days).
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The 1954 case of Hughes v. Hughes3" involved the applica-
bility of the indisputable presumption in a unique situation. There
cohabitation was established but the husband, though not impotent,
was found to be sterile. The court stated exceptions to the presump-
tion where the husband was incompetent or if it was impossible by
the laws of nature for him to be the father. Finding that sterility
fell within both of the announced exceptions, the court held that
the indisputable presumption was not applicable.
If the cases after Mills had established a trend away from the
rule that no evidence could be received to rebut the indisputable
presumption, that trend was reversed in Kusior v. Silver. 7 In that
action to establish paternity and provide support, the mother offered
blood test evidence indicating that her husband was not within the
class of persons who could be the father. The central issue was the
court's instruction as to cohabitation but the primary impact of
the decision was felt in its holding that blood test results were ad-
missible to rebut the disputable presumption but not the indis-
putable presumption.
The court attached special significance to the legislature's 1953
enactment of a modified version of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests
to Establish Paternity. 8 The court reasoned that the adoption of
section four of the Uniform Act"9 was a legislative determination
that blood tests were to be conclusive in every case where they were
admissible4" provided that all the experts concurred in the results.
However, the court further reasoned that the legislature's omission
of section five of the Uniform Act 4 relating to the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during wedlock, indicated its intention
that such tests should not be admissible to overcome the indisput-
able presumption.4 2
Legislative inaction since Kusior suggests that the supreme
court correctly interpreted the legislative intent in omitting section
36 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954), noted in 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 185
(1955).
37 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960), noted in 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 852 (1960) and 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 104 (1960).
38 CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 890-97 (West 1966), formerly CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
99 1980.1-.7 (West 1955) [hereinafter cited as the UNIFORM ACT].
39 CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West 1966), formerly CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1980.6
(West 1955).
40 54 Cal. 2d at 619-20, 354 P.2d at 668, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
41 "The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome
if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests, show that the husband is not the father of the child." UNIFORm
'ACT § 5.
42 54 Cal. 2d at 618, 354 P.2d at 667, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
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five of the Uniform Act.4" This revitalization of the statutory con-
clusive presumption is further reflected in the recent Jackson44 and
Hess45 decisions, and calls for a reexamination of the doctrine of
"impossibility" as a defense to the presumptions of legitimacy.
TRACING THE DOCTRINE OF "IMPOSSIBILITY"
Much of the confusion that has surrounded the conclusive pre-
sumption of Evidence Code section 621 can be traced to language
in Walker and McNamara suggesting that where it is impossible
for the husband to have been the father, no conclusive presumption
applies. In retrospect, it appears that the suggestion was partly
correct and partly incorrect.
As already noted, even at early common law, the "conclusive"
presumption of legitimacy could be overcome by a showing that
the husband was impotent or beyond the realm at the time of con-
ception. 40 Proof of these facts demonstrated the impossibility of
his being the father. Banbury and Hargrave announced that the
presumption of legitimacy was prima facie but, at the same time,
limited the types of evidence by which it might be rebutted. As
before, proof of impotence or absence during the time when concep-
tion must have occurred would prove illegitimacy. Additionally,
even though there were opportunities for intercourse (giving rise
to a presumption that it had occurred), the modern rule allowed
proof that the husband had not had such intercourse at a time when,
according to the laws of nature, he could be the father.47 Thus, in
effect, legitimacy was conclusively presumed in every case where
the husband could not show, either by proof of impotence or nonin-
tercourse at the time of possible conception, that it was impossible
for him to have been the father.
In Mills, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the
43 "[E]fforts to enact legislation permitting blood tests to negate paternity
despite the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1962(5) failed enactment
in the legislative sessions of 1961 and 1963." Final Report of the Assembly Interim
Committee on Judiciary Relating to Domestic Relations, 23 ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM.
RE'. 1963-1965, No. 6, at 135 (1965). In 1965, the legislature reenacted Code of Civil
Procedure section 1962(5) into Evidence Code section 621. The only change at that
time was the substitution of "conclusively" for "indisputably." This, however, was
not intended to effect any substantive change. Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 243
n.1, 430 P.2d 289, 290 n.1, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649, 650 n.1 (1967); Cal. Law Revision
Comm'n, 7 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 105 (1965).
44 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
45 257 A.C.A. 618, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967), hearing denied, 68 A.C. No. 8 (1968)
(minutes at 3).
40 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
47 In Banbury, the phrase "according to the laws of nature" referred to the
gestation period; that is, evidence was offered to show nonintercourse at the time
of possible conception rather than, for example, divergent physical characteristics.
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Hargrave rules but announced that no evidence could be introduced
to rebut the indisputable presumption of section 1962 (5).48 Evi-
dence of the impossibility of his paternity could be admitted only
to avoid the operation of the presumption. That is, it was admissible
to establish impotence or to disprove cohabitation at the relevant
time. If those elements of the presumption were established, the
rule announced in Mills precluded consideration of further evidence
tending to prove the impossibility of the husband's paternity. In
Walker, the evidence did in fact show that there was no cohabita-
tion and, therefore, only the disputable presumption found in Civil
Code section 1944" was under consideration. The court found that
this section embodied the common law rules and held that the hus-
band was entitled to show that he had not taken advantage of op-
portunities for intercourse with his wife during the period of possible
conception. That is, by proof of nonintercourse, he could show
the impossibility of his paternity. However, the court added that if
there was intercourse at a time when it was possible that he was the
father, legitimacy was conclusively presumed unless, by the laws
of nature, it was manifestly impossible for the child to be his, for
example where the husband and wife were white and the child a
mulatto.50
Thus, after Mills and Walker, the defense of impossibility went
at least this far: (1) as against the indisputable presumption, the
husband could show that it was impossible that the child was con-
ceived during the period of cohabitation5' or, because of im-
potence, it was impossible for him to be the father; (2) as
against the disputable presumptions, he could show that because
of impotence, or nonintercourse during the period of possible con-
ception, it was impossible for him to be the father, and further,
assuming that intercourse had been established, that according to
the laws of nature, it was manifestly impossible that he was the
person who had fathered the child.
McNamara restricted the operation of these rules to cases
where the length of the gestation period that would have to be
assumed in order to invoke them, was in accordance with the usual
operation of the laws of nature. The complication in McNamara lies
not in the rule established, but rather in the rationale announced.
The court said that the reason for applying a conclusive presump-
tion in the first place was the indeterminability of paternity in a
48 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1962(5) (now CAL. Evm. CODE § 621 (West 1966)).
49 CAL. CIV. CODE § 194 (now CAL. EviD. CODE § 661 (West 1966)).
50 180 Cal. at 491, 181 P. at 797.
51 That is, the husband could show that cohabitation and conception did not
concur and thus prevent the presumption from arising.
1968]
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case where both the husband and another may have had inter-
course with the wife at a time when, according to the laws of nature,
either could be the father.5 - Although this was consistent with the
court's statement in Walker that the husband was conclusively
presumed to be the father if there was actual intercourse during
the period of possible conception, it was equally clear from the
holding in Mills, that indeterminability played no part in the stat-
utory conclusive presumption arising upon proof of cohabitation.
As noted above, the Mills court rejected evidence that the husband
had not had intercourse with his wife but that Mills had. If be-
lieved, such evidence would clearly have eliminated any indetermin-
ability as between the husband and Mills.Y
It was reasonable for the McNamara court to hold that, when
considering unusual gestation periods, the case should not be deter-
mined "by any conclusive presumption of legitimacy."5' 4 However,
it is submitted that, insofar as McNamara suggests that it is always
proper for the husband to show the impossibility of his paternity by
proof that tends to eliminate an indeterminability as between him-
self and another, it should be taken to apply only to cases involving
the disputable presumption. That is, a husband who is not impotent
may rebut the disputable presumption by showing either noninter-
course or biological disparities tending to preclude him as the father.
However, in cases involving the indisputable presumption, his only
defense is that by the usual operation of the laws of nature, it is
not possible that the child was conceived at a time when he was
cohabiting with his wife. This construction is consistent not only
with the holding in Mills, but also with the results in the ensuing
cases55 with the possible exception of the district court decision in
Hughes v. Hughes.6
As mentioned previously, the court in Hughes found that the
"incompetency" exception to the common law presumption 7 had
been adopted as an exception to the indisputable presumption of
52 But see note 33 supra.
53 On the particular facts in Mills the evidence could not have been received even
if the court had accepted the "indeterminability" theory since it consisted of testimony
by the wife as to non-access. See note 23 supra. However, the Mills court clearly
based its rejection on the fact that the evidence was offered to dispute an indis-
putable presumption. 137 Cal. at 301, 70 P. at 92.
54 181 Cal. at 97, 183 P. at 558 (emphasis added).
55 See cases cited in notes 34 and 35 supra considering what is a usual period of
gestation. For the purposes of the conclusive presumption, the question in each case
was whether the child was conceived while the husband and wife were cohabiting.
56 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.2d 172 (1954). Compare Benes v. Young, 187 Cal.
App. 2d 270, 9 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1960). See also Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal. 2d 812, 198
P.2d 510 (1948) ; Adoption of Stroope, 232 Cal. App. 2d 581, 43 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1965).
57 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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Code of Civil Procedure section 1962(5)." The statute, however,
acknowledges only one exception-impotence. While, as the court
held, sterility may constitute incompetency, it does not constitute
impotence. 59 Additionally, the court adopted the McNamara rea-
soning that the husband was entitled to eliminate the element of
indeterminability by showing that it was impossible for him to be
the father. But, the Mills, Kusior and Hess cases, inferentially, and
the Jackson decision expressly indicate that with regard to the in-
disputable presumption, "impossibility" is relevant only insofar as
it relates to impotence or the husband's showing that it was impos-
sible for the child to have been conceived at a time when the parties
were cohabiting. Thus, any exception based on sterility is question-
able.
This increasingly literal construction of the statute is perhaps
best exemplified in Kusior.60 There the court acknowledged that by
allowing blood test results to be conclusive against the disputable
presumption of legitimacy," the legislature recognized their efficacy
in establishing biological impossibility of paternity. By precluding
such evidence in cases involving the indisputable presumption, the
legislature indicated an overriding public policy favoring the legiti-
macy of children born to married couples cohabiting at the time of
conception.62 Although the wisdom of this policy has been ques-
tioned,6 3 the policy itself persists, as evidenced by Jackson v. Jack-
son64 and Hess v. Whitsitt. 
5
Jackson AND Hess
In Jackson, the four days of cohabitation clearly fell within
the period of possible conception. The question was whether concep-
tion occurred during the brief cohabitation; if it did, the conclusive
presumption was applicable. Under the circumstances, there was
58 125 Cal. App. 2d at 785, 271 P.2d at 174.
59 Sterility: Barrenness; unfruitfulness; incapacity to germinate or reproduce.
Impotence: Inability to copulate. BLAcK's LAW DIcTioNARY 889, 1584 (4th ed. 1951) ;
Cf. 10 Amr. JUR. 2d Bastards § 22 (1963). But the terms have been used inter-
changeably. See, e.g., Benes v. Young, 187 Cal. App. 2d 270, 9 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1960).
But see Tosh v. Tosh, 214 Cal. App. 2d 483, 485, 29 Cal. Rptr. 613, 615 (1963).
60 Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d, 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
61 CAL. EvID. CODE § 895 (West 1966).
62 54 Cal. 2d at 619, 354 P.2d at 667-68, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
63 48 CALIF. L. REV. 852, 856 (1960); 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 104, 107-09 (1960).
"Though it may shock the legal mind to speak of an 'exception' to a conclusive
presumption, it is surely no less absurd to presume the impossible." 28 S. CAL. L.
REv. 185, 188 (1955).
64 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
65 257 A.C.A. 618, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967), hearing denied, 68 A.C. No. 8
(1968) (minutes at 3).
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almost no possibility that anyone other than the husband had an
opportunity for intercourse with the wife during the four days.
Blood test results precluding him as the father were strong evidence
that the child must have been conceived at some other time. He
was entitled to introduce such additional evidence as might be
necessary to prove that such was the case.
"When the issue is whether the child could possibly have been
conceived during cohabitation . . any competent evidence relevant
to the question is admissible.""0 This would include, for example,
evidence of divergent racial characteristics in a case where blood
tests were inadequate. In every case, however, the husband must
prove that neither he nor anyone else caused conception during the
period of cohabitation. Thus, the Jackson rule will probably be ap-
plicable only in cases where there was such brief cohabitation as
to enable the husband to account for all of his wife's time. If he can
do so, and the blood test results exclude him, he will have avoided
application of the conclusive presumption and overcome the dis-
putable presumption as well. 7
If, however, he cannot account for substantial portions of his
wife's time, the conclusive presumption may be applied notwith-
standing the blood test results.
It makes no difference whether the husband is the biological father, for
the basis of the inquiry is whether he is the legal father of the child; he
must be given a chance to prove that he is not the legal father by
demonstrating the impossibility that the child was conceived during
cohabitation with his wife.68
The possibility suggested in Jackson, that a man could be the
legal father despite a finding that he was not the biological father,
actually materialized in Hess v. Whitsitt.69 In that case, the perti-
nent findings of fact were:
1. Ruby Hess is the natural mother of the child. 2. The defendant
is the natural father of the child. 3. At the time of the conception
of the child, Ruby Hess was married to Wesley 0. Hess and was co-
habiting with him. 4. At the time of such conception Mr. Hess was
not impotent. 5. Mr. and Mrs. Hess are Caucasians. 6. Mr. Whitsitt,
the defendant, is a Negro. 7. The child "is of mixed blood, evidenc-
ing both Negro and Caucasian characteristics, and bears a close physical
resemblance to defendant." 70
16 Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 245, 430 P.2d 289, 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649,
651 (1967).
607 CAL. EviD. CODE § 895 (West 1966).
68 67 A.C. at 245, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
69 257 A.C.A. 618, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967), hearing denied, 68 A.C. No. 8 (1968)
(minutes at 3).
70 Id. at 618-19, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46.
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The court noted that once cohabitation was proved, the statute
was subject to only one exception, that of impotence of the husband.
While dicta in Walker and McNamara had announced a judicial
exception in a case involving divergent racial characteristics, no
such case had been decided in California prior to Hess.7 Moreover,
in the meantime, the supreme court had decided Kusior v. Silver.
The blood test evidence rejected there admittedly had as much
probative value as evidence of divergent racial characteristics. The
argument that such evidence justified an exception to the presump-
tion because it eliminated interdeterminability as between the
husband and others was not accepted in Kusior and was likewise
rejected in Hess.
The reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the legislative intent was
that there should be no encroachment upon the conclusive presump-
tion by means of such tests even though the use thereof would serve
the purpose of substantially lessening or overcoming "the element of
indeterminability" (the phrase found in McNamara).
It cannot be said that evidence of the nature of that to which re-
ference is made in the McNamara dictum is of greater probative value
than that furnished by resort to blood tests.
72
Taken together, Jackson and Hess clearly indicate that the con-
clusive presumption of Evidence Code section 621 is applicable in
every case where the husband is not impotent and the child was
conceived during cohabitation. The only relaxation of this rule
is where it is possible that the child was conceived during cohabita-
tion but the period of gestation necessarily assumed to establish that
possibility is unusual and contrary to the normal operation of the
laws of nature. Such a construction casts doubt on the sterility
exception announced in Hughes. That exception is only sustainable
if sterility is included within the definition of impotence. Whether
the supreme court will find that such is the legislative intent remains
to be seen.
Frank A. Iwama
71 See Estate of Marshall, 120 Cal. App. 2d 747, 262 P.2d 42 (1953) (dictum con-
ceding the racial difference exception to be the law).
72 257 A.CA. at 622, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
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